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No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eli-
gible to the Office of President ....
United States Constitution, article II
Despite its apparent simplicity, the natural-born citizen clause of the
Constitution1 has never been completely understood. It is well settled that
"native-born" citizens, those born in the United States, qualify as natural
born.2 It is also clear that persons born abroad of alien parents, who later
become citizens by naturalization,3 do not.4 But whether a person born
1. The rest of the clause reads, "neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
States." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. The Twelfth Amendment extended these requirements to the
Vice Presidency in 1804. U.S. CONsT. amend. XII ("[N]o person constitutionally ineligible to the
office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.").
2. See, e.g., Freedman, Presidential Timber: Foreign Born Children of American Parents, 35
CORNELL L.Q. 357 (1950); Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The Unresolved
Enigma, 28 MD. L. REv. 1 (1968); Means, Is Presidency Barred to Americans Born Abroad?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1955, at 26; Morse, Natural-Born Citizen of the United
States-Eligibility for the Office of President, 66 ALB. L.J. 99 (1904); McElwee, unpublished article
reprinted in 113 CONG. REc. 15,875 (1967).
Native-born citizens are natural born by virtue of the nearly universal principle of jus soli, or
citizenship of place of birth. See infra note 24. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment confirmed this
birthright citizenship, and guaranteed its application to groups that had previously been excluded,
such as the descendants of former slaves, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857);
see infra Section II-B. See generally United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (child
born on American soil of alien parents is American citizen); Von Schwerdtner v. Piper, 23 F.2d 862
(D. Md. 1928) (same); Tomasicchio v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1951) (same); infra note
65.
A few commentators have argued or assumed that only native-born citizens qualify as natural-born.
See infra note 8.
3. "Naturalization" here refers to the procedure codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1459 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986), whereby a citizen of another country elects to become a citizen of the United States.
For more on use of the term, see infra notes 35, 70-72 and accompanying text; Section III.
4. The ineligibility of subsequently naturalized citizens for the Presidency is mentioned in Schnei-
der v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165, 177 (1964); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946);
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673 (1944); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22
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abroad of American parents, or of one American and one alien parent, 5
qualifies as natural born has never been resolved.6 Eligibility for children
of American Indians born on reservations, persons born in United States
territories, children born on American military bases, and children of
United States diplomats stationed abroad is also uncertain.'
Constitutional scholars have traditionally approached the uncertainty
surrounding the meaning of the natural-born citizen clause by inquiring
into the specific meaning of the term "natural born" at the time of the
Constitutional Convention. They conclude that a class of citizens should
be considered natural born today only if they would have been considered
natural-born citizens under the law in effect at the time of the framing of
(1913).
5. Whether, in cases of one citizen and one alien parent, the father or the mother is the alien
might also affect natural born status since, under American naturalization statutes in effect around the
time of the Constitutional Convention, the citizenship of the child depended upon the citizenship and
residency of the father. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103, 104. The American naturalization acts
were based on earlier British statutes. See, e.g., An act . . . For naturalizing . . . the children of
natural-born subjects of the crown, 4 Geo. 2, ch. 21 (1731). The Supreme Court in Montana v.
Kennedy concluded that the Naturalization Act of 1802, the controlling statute at the time of the
petitioner's birth, made children born abroad citizens only if their fathers were or had been citizens.
Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 310-11 (1961). Until 1934, citizenship of the mother could not
be passed on to her foreign-born children. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 826 (1971).
6. The Supreme Court has mentioned the natural-born citizen clause in dicta but has never ruled
on its meaning. See, e.g., Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. at 829; supra note 4.
This constitutional uncertainty persists despite the fact that the issue has arisen frequently over the
past twenty years in discussions over the potential candidacies of foreign-born politicians such as
Barry Goldwater, Lowell Weicker, George Romney, Christian D. Herter, and Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Jr. Goldwater was born in the territory of Arizona before it became a state; Weicker, in Paris of an
American father and British mother; Romney, of American parents in Mexico; Herter, of Americans
in France; Roosevelt, in Canada. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1; see also Saire, The Constitution's
Flaw, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1987, at E15, col. 2 (proposing constitutional amendment explicitly al-
lowing naturalized citizens to become President).
The 1980 Census showed that over seven million United States citizens had been born abroad, over
a million of these to American parents. Both groups of citizens have increased significantly since 1950.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 36-37 (107th ed. 1987). The increasing number of Americans (here, persons with a claim to
U.S. citizenship at birth under current naturalization laws, see infra note 89) born abroad increases
the chances that foreign-born American citizens will seek the Presidency or occupy offices that are
high on the list for presidential succession. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amends. XX, XXV;
3 U.S.C. § 19 (1982). This Note is an attempt to resolve a question that is now more likely than ever
to be asked.
7. Natural born status is uncertain for these groups either because they would not have been
citizens of the United States in the past, or because they are not born in the United States and would
therefore be excluded under an interpretation that limits the clause to native borns.
In 1790 the first naturalization statute applied only to free white inhabitants. The status of Ameri-
can Indians and people born in U.S. territories was unclear or inferior under the laws in effect at the
time of the framing. See e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884) (American Indians do not
acquire citizenship at birth even though born in U.S.). Today these groups are given citizenship at
birth under 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982). Many of the pre-constitutional statutes that could have served
as models for the framers granted citizenship to foreign-born children where the father was a citizen
and the mother an alien, but not vice versa. See supra note 5.
In 1870 the naturalization laws were amended to explicitly include blacks. The Chinese Exclusion
Acts of 1882, 1888, and 1892 placed restrictions on the naturalization of Japanese, Chinese, Hindus,
Afghans, Burmese, and Hawaiians; the last of these restrictions was not removed until 1952. See
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769, 791 n.95 (1971)
[hereinafter Note, Constitutional Limitations].
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the Constitution.8 The traditional approach has not established the
clause's full and precise meaning, however, because it fails to adequately
consider 9 a critical analytical question that must inform our understand-
ing of the constitutional text: What is the proper role for Congress in
giving specific content to the natural-born citizen clause? This Note ar-
gues that the natural-born citizen clause can only be properly understood
if we appreciate the interplay of that clause with the naturalization pow-
ers clause of article I,'* as modified by section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
8. These writers assume that the phrase "natural born citizen" was a term of art during the pre-
constitutional period since the phrase is not defined in either the Constitution or the records of the
Constitutional Convention. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 2 ("The only explanation for the use of this
term is the apparent belief of the Framers that its connotation was clear."); Freedman, supra note 2,
at 358 (quoting Morse, supra note 2, at 100). But see Means, supra note 2, at 27 (" 'Natural born
Citizen'. . . never was an expression in common use. . . ."). They examine the records of the Con-
vention and the contemporaneous law in Britain and the colonies to determine whether the framers
intended to include U.S. citizens born abroad when they chose the words "natural born citizen." But
they disagree over the lessons these sources teach. For example, on the issue of who was "natural
born" under the common law, and to what extent the framers adopted the common law definition, one
writer asserts: "It is clear that under the English common law this term 'natural born' meant 'native
born.'. . . It was this genuine 'native-born' citizen . . . to which the framers of the Constitution
referred when they used the term 'natural-born citizens' as one of the qualifications for the Presi-
dent." McElwee, supra note 2, at 15,876 (emphasis added); see also id. at 15,879-80 (author criti-
cizes Morse, Freedman, and Means articles, supra note 2). Another concludes exactly the opposite:
"The framers of the Constitution did not limit eligibility for the Presidency to 'native-born citizens,'
but used the broader term of 'natural born citizen' with its common law background." Freedman,
supra note 2, at 364 (emphasis added). A third contends that the common law by itself is not determi-
native of the framers' intent:
[T]he leading British authorities agree that under the early common law, status as a natural-
born subject probably was acquired only by those born within the realm, but that the statutes
• . . enabled natural-born subjects to transmit equivalent status at birth to the children born to
them outside of the kingdom.
... There was no warrant for supposing that the Framers wished to deal less generously
with their own children.
Gordon, supra note 2, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is not surprising that the traditional approach has led some to conclude that children born
abroad of Americans are natural-born citizens, see Gordon, supra note 2; Means, supra note 2;
Freedman, supra note 2; Morse, supra note 2; one to conclude that persons born abroad to an Ameri-
can and an alien are natural born, see Seligman, A Brief for Gov. Romney's Eligibility For President,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1967, at 1, col. 5; and others to conclude that "natural-born citizens" must be born
on American soil. See Blum, Is Gov. George Romney Eligible to be President?, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 16,
1967, at 1, col. 5; Safire, supra note 6; McElwee, supra note 2; sources cited in Freedman, supra
note 2, at 357 n.2; Press release of Senator Thomas Eagleton (Nov. 26, 1982); see also Weedin v.
Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 663 (1927) (court observes in dicta, "under the common law which applied
in this country, the children of citizens born abroad were not citizens but were aliens") (emphasis
added).
9. Several sources raise but do not answer the question of whether Congress may modify the
categories of persons included under the natural-born citizen clause. See Freedman, supra note 2, at
364; Gordon, supra note 2, at 9; Means, supra note 2, at 29.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. (Congress shall have power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization").
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.").
The natural-born citizen clause and the naturalization powers clause come together in section one
of the Fourteenth Amendment since the Amendment both distinguishes native-born and naturalized
citizens ("born [in] or naturalized") and equalizes them (both are guaranteed the same rights under
the Amendment). See infra Section II-B. By the terms of the Amendment, at the very least, native-
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To succeed where the traditional approach has failed, this Note pursues
a broadened scope of inquiry, examining all of the constitutional provi-
sions related to defining citizenship and presidential eligibility.1 2 It treats
the clause not as defining by itself whom the framers meant to include;
instead, it recognizes Congress' role, through legislation, to determine who
is a natural-born citizen.'3 Finally, it argues that a broadened inquiry
should consider why a "bright line" prospective test might be more consis-
tent with other structural principles of the Constitution.
Section I follows the traditional method of approaching the natural-
born citizen clause, and illustrates the fundamental indeterminacy and in-
completeness of this approach.14 Section II demonstrates that Congress'
born citizens must be natural born. See supra note 2; infra note 65. But the three provisions then
pose the question, who else of these persons "born or naturalized" is natural born, if any?
For an example of the consequences of failing to interpret the three definitional citizenship provi-
sions together, see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
12. Many other constitutional provisions contain the term "citizen." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cI. 2, and § 3, cI. 3; art. III, § 2, cl. 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; amend. XI; amend. XV, § 1; amend. XIX;
amend. XXVI. These provisions are distinguishable from the three with which we are presently
concerned in that they do not tend to define or make distinctions among types of citizens; other than
describing the rights that citizens hold or the requirement that one be a citizen in order to have those
rights, they do nothing to elucidate the meaning of "citizen."
13. In 1790 Congress enacted a bill pursuant to its naturalization powers that provided: "And the
children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of the
United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens .. " Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103,
104 (emphasis added). This bill, and those that followed it, Act of Jan. 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414, 415; Act
of Apr. 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 153, 155; Act of Feb. 10, 1855, 10 Stat. 604, have been discussed mainly as
near contemporaneous evidence of whom the framers meant to identify by the natural-born citizen
clause, rather than as definitions in their own right of which groups will have natural born status.
The wording of the first Act probably indicates the early Congress' belief in its power to declare
who would be natural-born citizens. See infra text accompanying note 76. Another interpretation is
that in passing the Act Congress meant to follow the English tradition of statutes "clarifying" the
common law. These statutes rarely simply clarified; instead, they expanded, created exceptions to, or
narrowed the application of, the common law. See, for example, the debate among Parry, C. PARRY,
NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRE-
LAND 32-33 (1957), Piggott, F. PIGGOTr, NATIONALITY 41 (1907), and Plowden, F. PLOWDEN, A
DISQUISITION CONCERNING THE LAW OF ALIENAGE AND NATURALIZATION ACCORDING TO STAT-
UTES IN FORCE BETWEEN THE 10TH OF JUNE, 1818, AND THE 25TH OF MARCH, 1819, at 13 (1818),
over whether De Natis Ultra Mare, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 2 (1350), was declaratory of the common law or
law-enacting. It seems less likely that the Act of 1790 was declaratory, however, since the principle of
jus sanguinis, see infra note 24, on which it is based, was not originally a common law principle. See
A. MORSE, A TREATISE ON CITIZENSHIP BY BIRTH AND BY NATURALIZATION 9 (1881); F. PLOW-
DEN, supra, at 19; Freedman, supra note 2, at 359-60, 361 n.26. But cf. Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y.
356, 362-63 (1863) (children of English parents, though born abroad, are regarded by common law
as natural born).
For a discussion of limitations on Congress' power to interpret the clause, see infra note 65.
14. Gordon, for example, concludes that Congress "might pass a clarifying statute" but "[alt most,
it would express the opinion of the present Congress concerning the proper construction" of the
clause. Gordon, supra note 2, at 27. He does not discuss the possibility of the clause falling within
Congress' naturalization powers. Id. Morse argues that if the framers had meant to include only
native-born citizens, they would have said so, and bases his conclusion that foreign-born citizens are
natural-born on the age old doctrine of jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent), see infra note 24: "[I]t
is not the statute that constitutes children of American parentage citizens; it is the fact of American
descent, the jus sanguinis, that makes them citizens at the moment of birth-a fact which ... the
legislative power of the State recognizes and announces to the world." Morse, supra note 2, at 100.
Freedman elaborates on the Morse thesis and suggests that an American born abroad would be
natural born if she or her parents were "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" at her birth.
Freedman, supra note 2, at 364, 365. What he means by "subject to the jurisdiction of" is unclear,
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naturalization powers under the Constitution enable it to naturalize citi-
zens from birth. Section III marshals textual and structural support for
the alternative "naturalized born" approach, which reads the clause to
require that the presidential candidate be a citizen at the time of birth.
Under that approach, Congress has the power to define which classes of
people will be citizens upon birth, but it may not declare any person a
"citizen at birth" retroactively.15
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS
The traditional approach begins with a look at how the natural-born
citizen clause came to be included at the Constitutional Convention and
ends with an examination of British law in effect at the end of the 18th
century.
A. The Constitutional Convention
The records of the adoption of the clause by the delegates of the 1787
Constitutional Convention provide no evidence of the intended meaning of
the phrase "natural-born citizen."1" The Committee on Detail of the Con-
vention, given the task of converting the Convention's general ideas about
the office of Chief Executive into a concrete proposal, submitted without
comment a recommendation that the President be a "citizen" and a resi-
dent of the United States for at least twenty-one years.17 The "natural
born" requirement, along with a proposed reduction in the residency re-
quirement and addition of a "grandfather clause," 8 first emerged two
weeks later, on September 4,19 from the Committee of Eleven, whose re-
sponsibility it was to revise the draft in accord with the suggestions of the
but it appears to be based on something like the old English principle of allegiance. See infra Section
I-B. Because of the focus on ancient legal principles instead of current naturalization statutes, Morse
and Freedman cannot resolve whether or not both parents must be citizens; and under their approach
the facts of each person's case must be examined individually in order to determine natural born
status. Furthermore, they are unable* to define satisfactorily "subject to the jurisdiction of" because of
the vagueness of their historical sources.
15. For example, Congress could not declare in 1987 that John Smythe, born an alien in 1952,
"shall henceforth be a citizen at birth." Nor could Congress declare an entire class of living John
Smythes (e.g., "all persons descended from Henry VIII") to be citizens at birth. For a discussion of
what might happen if Congress said in 1987, "all persons born after this day who are descended from
Henry VIII shall be citizens at birth," see infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
16. This is particularly surprising given that the Articles of Confederation contained no provision
for a Chief Executive and the framers of article II were "writing on a clear slate." Gordon, supra
note 2, at 3.
17. 1 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONsrIrUTIoN 256-57 (2d ed. 1836).
18. The grandfather clause appears in article II: "No person except a natural born Citizen, or a
Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
Office of President .... " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the
importance of this provision, see infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
19. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 498 (rev. ed.
1937).
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delegates." The Committee did not explain the change to "natural born"
citizen, and the Convention approved the revisions without debate. The
Committee on Style and Arrangement, or Committee on Revision,2 2 re-
tained the presidential qualifications without substantial change, and the
provision was adopted without debate. 3 The deliberations of the Consti-
tutional Convention, therefore, provide no clue to the meaning of the
phrase.
B. British and Colonial Law Prior to Adoption of the Constitution
The guiding principle of nationality law in England was that anyone
born on British soil, with few exceptions, was a "natural-born British
subject."24 In 1350, British statutes began to provide that persons born
abroad, whose parents were both British subjects, would enjoy the same
rights of inheritance as those born in England. 5 In 1709, a statute de-
clared that children born abroad of a natural-born father and alien
mother were natural-born subjects at the time of their birth.26 By 1731,
an English statute extended natural born status to the foreign-born
grandchildren of natural-born subjects." Prior to 1740, the British Act of
Settlement had prevented British subjects born abroad from sitting in Par-
liament or holding other high public office. 8 The Act of 1740 declared
20. Thach explains that the Committee of Eleven was created to dispose of unfinished business;
the presumption was that whatever it decided would be accepted by the Convention. The Committee
was most concerned with the electoral college provision. See C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE
PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at 131-32 (1923).
21. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 284, 302; 5 id. at 507.
22. This Committee was charged with giving a "final literary polish" to the finished Constitution.
C. THACH, supra note 20, at 138.
23. 1 J. ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 302; 5 id. at 507, 562.
24. This was the common law principle of jus solis. Civil law, however, was founded on the
principle of jus sanguinis, which granted citizenship at birth by descent or inheritance. Colonists
inherited primarily, but not exclusively, English common law; the juxtaposition of both sources of law
made nationality law in the colonies even more complex. See generally Fluornoy, Dual Nationality
and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1921).
A number of exceptions to jus solis further complicated matters. Neither children born on British
soil to foreign ambassadors or occupying forces, nor children born on foreign ships in British waters
were natural-born subjects. Conversely, children born on ships in international waters to British par-
ents were natural born. See id.; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 659-60, 682 (1898).
25., See De Natis Ultra Mare, 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 2 (1350). In 1699 a statute removed another of the
common law disabilities preventing inheritance by aliens by providing that a natural-born subject
could inherit, even where the mother or father or both were aliens. See An act to enable his Majesty's
natural-born Subjects to inherit ... notwithstanding their mother or father were aliens, 11 & 12 Will.
3, ch. 6 (1699).
26. An Act for naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 7 Anne, ch. 5, § 3 (1709), clarified, see supra
note 13, by An act ... For naturalizing the children of natural-born subjects of the crown, 4 Geo. 2,
ch. 21 (1731).
27. An Act ... For naturalizing the children of natural-born subjects of the crown, 4 Geo. 11, ch.
21 (1731). The grandchildren thereby acquired all rights of natural-born subjects, except the ability to
pass natural born status on to their offspring. See J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP 1608-1870, at 15 n.10 (1978).
28. Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch. 2 (1701); An Act to explain the act made in ... the
reign of King William the Third, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 4 (1714). It is not clear whether or not the Act
of Settlement applied to the colonies after the Declaration of Independence. See J. KETTNER, supra
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these newly created "natural-born subjects" eligible to hold all public of-
fices in the colonies that previously had been barred to them under the Act
of Settlement.29
But the extent to which the colonies adopted British nationality law
varied widely.30 It was unclear how existing precedents of nationality law
applied to the colonies, since these cases dealt specifically with England or
previously independent lands acquired by conquest or descent. 1 Promi-
nent jurists of the time disagreed over the proper legal analogy for the
colonies, while the colonists wanted the protection of the British common
law without being subject to control by Parliament.3 This already com-
plex heritage became more complicated when the colonies passed their
own naturalization laws prior to the Declaration of Independence.33
After independence, no uniform rules of naturalization existed prior to
the first exercise by Congress of its naturalization powers, the Naturaliza-
tion Act of 1790."4 Thus, at the time of the framing of the Constitution,
note 27, at 77, 123-26.
It has been suggested that the framers meant to copy the British Act of Settlement in excluding
citizens born abroad from holding high public office. This seems unlikely since the colonists were
angered by the Act, which they perceived as an attempt to limit immigration to the colonies. Id. at
124-26. The Declaration of Independence accused George III of having "endeavoured to prevent the
population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners;
[and] refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither." The Declaration of Independence
para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
29. An Act for naturalizing such foreign Protestants ... as are settled, or shall settle, in any of his
Majesty's colonies, 13 Geo. 2, ch. 7 (1740), clarified by 13 Geo. 3, ch. 25 (1773). The Acts of 1740
and 1773 did not, however, allow colonists to hold public office in Ireland or Great Britain.
30. See J. KETTNER, supra note 27, at 78, 90-93; see also E. BROWN, BRrrsSH STATUTES IN
AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 14 (1964) (There was "wide variety in the degree to which both
common and statute law was 'received' into the colonies... [and] unlikeness of local law ... became
the rule").
The doctrinal confusion was due in part to variations of citizenship drawn from both jus solis and
jus sanguinis principles. See supra note 24. There was also a good deal of uncertainty over whether
and/or when the colonists ceased to be British subjects. See, e.g., Kettner, Subjects or Citizens? A Note
on British Views Respecting the Legal Effects of American Citizenship, 62 VA. L. REv. 945 (1976);
Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830) (persons born in America ceased to be British subjects
as of Declaration of Independence); Teare v. White's Adm'rs, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 210 (1815) (date
of reference is adoption of Constitution); Palmer v. Downer, 2 Mass. 179 (1806) (same); State v.
Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 20, 24 (1838) (British subjects in North Carolina became
North Carolina citizens "[u]pon the Revolution").
31. J. KETTNER, supra note 27, at 80-82, 135-36.
32. Id. at 134, 148-56.
33. At the outset little uniformity of procedure existed among the various colonies .... Sev-
eral colonies permitted naturalization by enrollment, establishing general requirements for ad-
mission to be administered by local courts. Elsewhere, admission to freemanship served as the
analogue of naturalization, particularly in New England, where both the towns and the cen-
tral government were involved. Royal governors and lords proprietary issued patents of deniza-
tion, and local assemblies passed both general and special acts of naturalization.
Id. at 83.
34. See F. VAN DYNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NATURALIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 6 (1907); Note, Limitations on the Power of Congress to Confer Citizenship by Naturaliza-
tion, 50 IOWA L. REv. 1093, 1094 (1965) [hereinafter Note, Limitations]; Note, Constitutional Limi-
tations, supra note 7.
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there was no common understanding of what "natural born citizen"
meant.35
C. Jay's Letter to Washington and Hamilton's Draft
The phrase "natural born citizen" appears once in the papers of the
founders. 6 In a letter predating the appearance of the phrase in the Com-
mittee of Eleven report by six weeks, John Jay wrote to George
Washington:
Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise . . . to provide a
strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration
of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Com-
mand in chief of the american army shall not be given to, nor de-
volve on, any but a natural born Citizen.37
The letter is generally assumed to be the source of the phrase in the Con-
stitution.3 8 Some writers have suggested that Jay was responding to ru-
mors that foreign princes might be asked to assume the Presidency.39 But
the only firm conclusions that may be drawn from the letter are that Jay
was interested in creating some guarantee of allegiance to the United
States for high office holders and that he placed special significance on the
word "born."
35. However, nothing in British or early American precedent requires a mutual exclusivity of
"naturalized" and "natural-born" or "citizen at birth." "To the Framers in 1787 there would have
been no incongruity in suggesting that a citizen by parentage was both 'naturalized' and 'natural-
born'; to them 'native' and 'naturalized' were the mutually exclusive terms ...." Means, supra note
2, at 27; see also J. KETrNER, supra note 27, at 16 & n.13, 17, 30, 33-34 (naturalization originally
meant to put subject in exactly the same legal position as a natural-born subject).
In a five-year study by a Cabinet commission, undertaken to revise U.S. nationality law and result-
ing in the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952), the commission, noting
that it was "still a subject of debate" whether natural-born citizens include persons born abroad to
American citizens, acknowledged the possibility "that the framers might have contemplated a broader
connotation of 'naturalization,' which would include the acquisition of citizenship at birth by children
born abroad to American citizens." Gordon, supra note 2, at 15.
British statutes have provided for this result for British subjects since the 14th century. See supra
notes 25-29.
36. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 4-5 .
37. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 61 (emphasis in original).
38. See Gordon, supra note 2; Means, supra note 2; Safire, supra note 6.
39. See C. THACH, supra note 20, at 137 (The name of Baron von Steuben was often mentioned;
Thach contends, "[Tihere can be little doubt that it was [von Steuben]... with his sympathies for the
followers of Shay, and his evidently suspected dealings with Prince Henry of Prussia, whom Jay had
in mind when he penned these words."); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §
1473 (1833). To assuage the public's fears about rumors of foreign princes being asked to assume the
presidency, the framers "leaked" the following unofficial statement to the Philadelphia press:
We are informed that many letters have been written to the members of the Federal Conven-
tion .. .respecting the reports idly circulating that it is intended to establish a monarchical
government to send for (Prince Frederick Augustus), &c. &c.-to which it has been uniformly
answered, 'though we cannot, affirmatively, tell you what we are doing, we can, negatively,
tell you what we are not doing-we never once thought of a king.
Means, supra note 2, at 28 (quoting from the Pennsylvania Journal, Aug. 22, 1787).
For more on the framers' distrust of foreigners, see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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These conclusions are strengthened by the existence of another docu-
ment, which, oddly enough, has never been mentioned in previous discus-
sions of the clause. On June 18, a little over a month before Jay's letter,
Alexander Hamilton submitted a "sketch of a plan of government which
'was meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest
the amendments which he should probably propose . . . in . . . future
discussion.' "4o Article IX, section 1 of the sketch provided: "No person
shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be
now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the
United States."' Hamilton's draft, which appears to be an early version
of the natural-born citizen clause, contains two distinct ideas: first, that
those currently citizens will not be excluded from presidential eligibility,
and second, that the President must be born a citizen. Without the modi-
fier "natural," the essence of the text is apparent: The President need not
be native born, but must be a citizen from birth.
The indeterminacy of the traditional search for specific intent is evi-
dent."2 The records of the Convention provide no answer 3 as to whether
children born abroad of citizens might be considered natural born. The
laws of Britain tell us only that they would have been natural-born sub-
jects of Britain and, arguably, only up until independence."' Nor does the
Jay letter or the Hamilton draft, without reference to subsequent natural-
ization statutes, tell us anything about which categories of people would
be included by their phrases.
II. THE NATURALIZATION POWER: DEFINING CITIZENSHIP FOR
PURPOSES OF THE NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN CLAUSE
A. The Breadth of Congress' Naturalization Powers
Section I demonstrated that a study of the framers' intent yields no con-
clusive definition of "natural born citizen." This Section suggests that the
Constitution grants Congress the power to give precise meaning to the
natural-born citizen clause.45 This conclusion is based on an analysis of
40. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 617.
41. Id. at 629.
42. See Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1189, 1198-99 (1987) (discussing difference between specific and general or "abstract"
intent).
43. In contrast to the traditional approach, this Note treats the records and history of the Conven-
tion not as dispositive on the meaning of the text, but only as confirming what a commonsense reading
of the text already suggests.
44. See supra Section I-B.
45. This Note does not argue that because the law of the time was muddled, Congress gains the
power to give the clause definition merely by default. Rather, it demonstrates that in an area where
the common law was in flux, the framers explicitly left to later Congresses the task of filling in the
specifics. Cf. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 235-238 (discussion of possibility of leaving to Con-
gress the duty of providing specific citizenship and property requirements for congressional
officeholders).
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the historical development and application of Congress' naturalization
power and the Fourteenth Amendment's modification of the boundaries of
that power.
1. A Brief History of Naturalization in the United States
a. Constitutional Convention Revisited
The failure to enact effective naturalization rules under the Articles of
Confederation46 led to the Constitutional Convention's adoption of uni-
form naturalization rules with relatively little dispute.47 By contrast, the
related issue of citizenship and residency requirements for Congressional
offices was hotly debated. That debate-which reflected a tension between
the desire to encourage immigration and reward foreigners who had
served the new nation well, and the fear of disloyal foreigners acquiring
positions of power 4S-informs our understanding of the framers' view of
Congress' constitutional role in exercising its naturalization power.
In the debates, the framers expressed concern about retroactively de-
priving those currently citizens of the right to hold office."9 But the re-
quirement of citizenship was eventually agreed upon "without any consid-
erable opposition" 50 because it signified to the framers that the individual
had some permanent interest in or attachment to his government.5" At the
same time, James Madison thought, and Hamilton seemed to agree, that
while citizenship should be required, the number of years should not be
specified in the Constitution; to do so would infringe upon the legisla-
ture's duty of naturalization.52
46. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation had been an attempt to remedy the lack of uniform
naturalization rules in the colonies. See supra Section I-B. Article IV provided that, "[T]he free
inhabitants of each of these states ... shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens
in the several states ...." Articles of Confederation, art. IV (U.S. 1781). But article IV created new
difficulties: the strange wording seemed to allow an inhabitant of one state to become a citizen of
another simply by crossing the border. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 269-71 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). Even if, as some argued, "inhabitants" and "citizens" were interchangeable, the
lax naturalization requirements of some states allowed circumvention of the stricter rules of others
through article IV. See F. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 17-18 (1969); 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 120, 359, 548.
47. See 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 245, 247; 2 id. at 144, 167, 182, 569; 3 id. at 120, 359,
548; F. FRANKLIN, supra note 46, at 30.
48. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 235-238, 243.
Those in favor of having no citizenship requirement, or a very short or unspecified one, argued that
meritorious foreigners would feel "discouragement & mortification," id. at 237, from being "marked
with suspicious incapacitations." Id. at 236; see also id. at 122; THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Others claimed that foreigners "bring with them, not only attach-
ments to other Countries, but ideas of Govt. so distinct from ours that in every point of view they are
dangerous." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 236; see id. at 216-18; 235-38, 243.
49. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 237, 270-72.
50. 3 id. at 147.
51. Id.
52. [Madison] thought any restriction (however) in the Constitution unnecessary, and im-
proper. unnecessary; because the Natl. Legislre. is to have the right of regulating naturaliza-
tion, and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of residence as conditions of enjoying dif-
ferent privileges of Citizenship: Improper: ... because it will put it out of the power of the
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b. Naturalization Act of 1790
Congress' first act concerning citizenship, the Naturalization Act of
1790, was consistent with Madison's and Hamilton's understanding. In
that act Congress provided that "the children of citizens of the United
States, that may be born beyond the sea,... shall be considered as natu-
ral born citizens . . . ."I Although the phrase was deleted in a later act
for unknown reasons,5 the Act was never challenged as being beyond the
scope of Congress' naturalization power.
c. Subsequent Legislation
Congress' broad discretion to determine who shall be a citizen of the
United States, under its power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturali-
zation,"55 is implicitly acknowledged in subsequent statutory and judicial
authority.
Current immigration and naturalization statutes make certain classes of
foreign-born children citizens at birth, as have naturalization statutes
since the first naturalization act in 1790.58 That these statutes have never
been challenged on the grounds that they are outside the authority dele-
gated by the naturalization clause establishes de facto Congress' power to
naturalize from birth.57 In United States v. Wong Kim Ark,58 a landmark
opinion which held that a child born in the United States to foreign na-
tionals is a United States citizen at birth, the Supreme Court described
legislation making certain classes of foreign-born persons citizens at birth
as an exercise of the naturalization power. It thus acknowledged that
Congress' naturalization power was not limited to establishing rules for
making former foreign nationals into citizens:
This [first] sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is declaratory of
Natl Legislature . . . to confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers ....
2 id. at 235-36 (emphasis in original); see also 5 J. ELLioT, supra note 17, at 411.
53. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (emphasis added).
54. One writer has speculated that the phrase was deleted accidentally, see Freedman, supra note
2, at 362, while another suggests that "[plossibly the [phrase] was deemed archaic or superfluous."
Gordon, supra note 2, at 11; see also Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 665 (1927) ("Congress
must have thought that the questions of naturalization and of the conferring of citizenship on sons of
American citizens were related."); cf. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 714 (1898)
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (statute "passed out of abundant caution to obviate misunderstandings"
about citizenship of foreign-born children of Americans).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; cf Note, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 7, at 770, 810
(arguing that unfettered congressional power to deny naturalization should be limited by "normal
standards of constitutional adjudication"); Note, Limitations, supra note 34, (arguing that congres-
sional power to deny naturalization should be subject to limits of First and Fifth Amendments and bill
of attainder clause). Neither of these pieces deny the unlimited power of Congress to bestow citizen-
ship. Furthermore, their basic arguments are consistent with this Note's approach to reading the
Fourteenth Amendment "back into" the original Constitution. See infra note 66.
56. See supra note 13.
57. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1409 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
58. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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existing rights .... But it has not touched the acquisition of citizen-
ship by being born abroad of American parents; and has left that
subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress, in the
exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization.59
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
In response to Dred Scott v. Sandford,0 which held that blacks-even
though born in the United States and of emancipated parents-were not
citizens, the Fourteenth Amendment provided a constitutional definition of
citizenship: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside."'" While there is no discretion left to Con-
gress in the first phrase of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 -"[a]ll persons
born" in the United States are ipso facto citizens 3-the second phrase of
that clause, "or naturalized in the United States," is the exclusive prov-
ince of Congress.64
The effect of the Amendment is to deny Congress the power to deter-
mine who shall be native-born citizens, despite its naturalization powers.65
But how does this limitation intersect with the natural-born citizen
clause? 8 It seems that "natural born" cannot be a category outside of
59. Id. at 688.
60. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. See supra note 2; infra note 65.
63. But cf. P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT (1985) (arguing that
native-born children of illegal aliens might not be citizens for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment
based on phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof").
64. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898); Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel Thayer,
143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892); Chirac v. Chirac's Lessee, 15 U.S. 259, 268 (1817); Ly Shew v. Acheson,
110 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal.), vacated on other grounds, 219 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1953); F. VAN
DYNE, supra note 34, at 6-9 (1907). The exclusive power of Congress to naturalize was also recog-
nized by the framers. See, e.g., 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 120; THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A.
Hamilton); id. No. 42 (J. Madison).
65. Citizenship acquired by birth in the United States is granted by the Fourteenth Amendment
itself, not by Congress. Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 1007, 1044 (1976);
see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 249 (1964) ("The Fourteenth Amendment ...makes every
person who is born here a citizen.") (Douglas, J., concurring); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168
(1964); Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702.
Nor has Congress any power over the natural born status of native-born citizens. See supra note 2.
It has never been suggested that Congress has the power to deny natural born status to native borns.
Here it might be helpful to distinguish between the power to define the clause (e.g., to say that
"natural born" means "born in California") and the power to naturalize from birth (to include addi-
tional classes of people within the scope of the clause). Congress has only the latter power under the
Constitution. Thus Congress can expand the category of natural-born citizens to encompass more than
simply native borns, but it may not contract the category below the native born minimum set by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See P. SCHUCK & R. SMrrH, supra note 63, at 50; F. VAN DYNE, CITIZEN-
SHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1904) (" '[Olur Constitution, in speaking of natural born citizens,
uses no affirmative language to make them such, but only recognizes and reaffirms the universal
principle... that the people born in a country do constitute the nation.'" (quoting 10 Op. Att'y Gen.
394 (1862))).
66. The relative paucity of primary source materials on the adoption of the Thirteenth, Four-
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"born ... in the United States" and "naturalized," or it would be outside
of constitutionally defined and protected citizenship.67 Thus, "natural
born" must be either synonymous with "native born" or also include a
subset of "naturalized."
III. THE "NATURALIZED BORN" APPROACH
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted
to mean that there are only two methods of acquiring citizenship: by birth
in or by naturalization in the United States.68 But this dichotomy is not a
proper basis for concluding, as the circuit court in Zimmer v. Acheson 69
did, for example, that the only two classes of citizens are native born and
naturalized, where "naturalized" is limited to citizens who do not ac-
quire their citizenship at birth.70 The misconception that naturalization
only refers to the acquisition of citizenship after birth remains a potential
stumbling block for the courts.71
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments has resulted in less attention being focused on their original intent
and history. See Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 289
(1987). Nevertheless, the importance of reading them "back into" the original Constitution cannot be
overstated in order to preserve the coherence and integrity of the document. Id. at 290-93. For an
argument that the Reconstruction Amendments can be seen as "perfecting the original Constitution,"
especially in their creation of a constitutional definition of citizenship, see Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1463-64 (1987).
67. Contra Gordon, supra note 2, at 15.
But this is exactly what happened in Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), when the Supreme
Court held that "the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to" a foreign-
born child of an American parent. Id. at 827.
Since the Supreme Court in [Rogers v.] Bellei held that jus sanguinis citizens [i.e., children
born abroad of Americans] are not citizens within the meaning of the citizenship clause [of the
Fourteenth Amendment], it follows that their privileges and immunities are not protected from
State action in the next sentence of the amendment.
Comment, Congressional Versus Constitutional Citizenship: Goodbye Section 301(b); the Song is
Gone but the Melody Lingers On, 2 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 331, 342-43 & n.60 (1978). But see
infra notes 91-92.
68. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964); Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702.
69. 191 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1951).
70. Id. at 211. Contra Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. at 840-44 (Black, J., dissenting) (citizenship
limited to two modes of Fourteenth Amendment, but "naturalized" includes citizenship acquired at
birth by statute); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 n.3 (1958) (Fourteenth Amendment sets forth
two "but by no means the only [modes]" for acquiring citizenship), overruled on other grounds,
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702-03 (citizens at birth created
by "naturalization" powers).
71. See supra notes 68-70. Some of the confusion is reflected in the fact that Congress and the
courts have been describing types of citizenship in different terms. Courts have characteristically dis-
tinguished between "native-born" and "naturalized" citizens, asserting that their status is the same
except that the latter are ineligible for the Presidency. See cases cited supra note 4; see also Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824). Yet, since 1795, naturalization statutes have spoken in
terms of "citizens" and "citizens at birth," see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1409 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
while the Fourteenth Amendment refers to persons "born" or "naturalized" in the United States. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Court might refer to dicta from Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. at 165, and similar cases, see
supra note 4, if the natural-born citizen question arose over a candidate claiming to be natural born
under statutes making non-native-born persons "citizens at birth." See e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 (c)-(f)
(persons born outside U.S. and/or its outlying possessions); id. § 1402 (persons born in Puerto Rico);
id. § 1406(b) (persons born in U.S. Virgin Islands); id. § 1409 (persons born out of wedlock) (1982 &
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Recognition of these "naturalized-born" 2 citizens-those made citizens
at birth by naturalization statutes, or treaties-as natural born best com-
ports with the text, history, and structure of the presidential eligibility,
naturalization, and citizenship provisions of the Constitution.
A. Textual and Historical Support
Discarding suggestions that "natural" might refer to legitimacy or to
the medical or physical circumstances of birth,73 the obvious connection
between "natural" in article II and "naturalization" in article I supports
the conclusion that the terms are not diametrically opposed; rather, natu-
ralization can create natural citizens.
This reading is bolstered by the Naturalization Act of 1790.7" The
Congress that passed the Act of 1790 included some of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention;" to that extent, the Act reflects the Conven-
tion's original understanding" of the delegation of power to Congress to
Supp. IV 1986). In striking down a statute providing that a naturalized citizen who resides in her
(foreign) country of birth for three years loses her U.S. citizenship, the Supreme Court in Schneider
observed that naturalized citizens, although equal to native-born citizens for all other purposes, are
ineligible for the Presidency under the natural-born citizen clause. A court might therefore conclude
that persons eligible for citizenship at birth under the aforementioned statutes [hereinafter "statutory
citizens at birth"] are ineligible for the Presidency. The two assumptions implicit in such a conclu-
sion-that statutory citizens at birth are naturalized and that naturalized citizens cannot be natural
born-are incorrect under the analysis of this Note when used together in such a way as to exclude
statutory citizens at birth from Presidential eligibility. Repudiation of either assumption-i.e., stating
that statutory citizens at birth are not naturalized, or stating that some naturalized citizens are eligible
for the presidency-would remove the barrier to these citizens becoming President under the afore-
mentioned decisions. This Note's analysis requires an acceptance of statutory citizens at birth as natu-
ralized (i.e., falling under Congress' naturalization powers) and a rejection of the second assumption,
thus broadening the definition of "natural born" to include those naturalized at birth.
Justice Black is the only member of the Court who has ever recognized this as a possible reading.
He states in his dissent in Rogers v. Bellei:
Although those Americans who acquire their citizenship under statutes conferring citizenship
on the foreign-born children of citizens are not popularly thought of as naturalized citizens, the
use of the word "naturalize" in this way has a considerable constitutional history .... [Tihe
First Congress conceived of this and most likely all other purely statutory grants of citizenship
as forms or varieties of naturalization. . . .As shown in Wong Kim Ark . . .[a~ll means of
obtaining American citizenship which are dependent upon a congressional enactment are forms
of naturalization.
401 U.S. at 839-41 (Black, J., dissenting); see also supra note 35.
72. This Note coins the term "naturalized born" rather than using "citizen at birth" or simply
"natural born" for two reasons: first, to emphasize that persons may be naturalized from birth-that
naturalization need not be ex post-and second, to make clear that the definition of such citizenship is
legitimately within the naturalization powers of Congress.
73. See Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1987, at E6, col. 2. No one, however, has
attempted to argue it seriously. Two writers use it rather facetiously in examples. See J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DisTRusT 13 (1980); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 207 (1980).
74. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103, 104. For additional discussion of this Act, see supra notes
5, 13, 53 & 54 and accompanying text.
75. Twenty of the 79 members of the first Congress had been delegates to the Convention. Of
these, eight had been members of the Committee of Eleven, the drafters of the presidential eligibility
clause. Gordon, supra note 2, at 8 n.57.
76. Arguing in terms of framers' intent requires some discussion of methodology. The purpose of
this Note is not to advocate a particular interpretative strategy. It is, instead, to find the most plausible
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make rules of naturalization. The first Congress not only exercised its
naturalization power to make citizens of children born abroad of United
States citizens, but it designated these citizens as "natural born." Thus, a
Congress nearly contemporaneous with the adoption of the clause believed
it had the power to define "natural born citizen" under its naturalization
powers.
But the constitutional text says not only "natural," it also says "born."
To be "born" something is to be it "from the time of birth." This is surely
what Jay had in mind when he emphasized "born": In the context of his
admitted concern over "the admission of Foreigners" into the national
government, requiring that the President be a citizen from birth would
prevent foreign princes from attaining that highest executive office. The
Hamilton draft makes the point even more starkly. Thus the text means,
literally, "naturalized" (natural) "at birth" (born)."
The constitutional text provides secondary support for the naturalized
born reading as well. First, set as it is among the other presidential eligi-
bility requirements, the natural-born citizen clause is surrounded by
bright-line rules. The framers required the President to be at least thirty-
five years old, not "mature." ' They also specified a fourteen-year resi-
dency requirement, even though some might have the requisite loyalty,
knowledge, and experience after a much shorter time. 9 This placement in
the text suggests that the framers considered the natural born qualification
to require not an investigation but simply reference to the naturalization
statutes in effect at the candidate's birth, which would yield an unambigu-
ous answer.
80
Second, the clause is juxtaposed with the "grandfather" provision that
exempts "Citizen[s] of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of
th[e] Constitution" ' from the natural born requirement; both provisions
reflect a certain wariness of arbitrary congressional action. The grandfa-
ther provision recalls the framers' fear of retrospective legal rules, ex-
interpretation of the natural-born citizen clause. The ideal interpretation is most consistent with con-
stitutional text, history, structure, and policy concerns, considered as a whole. If such coherence is
possible, no normative principle about the relative validity of these interpretative elements need be
expressed. See Fallon, supra note 42; see also supra note 43.
77. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "natural born" as "[h]aving a specified position or
character by birth." 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 38 (1961); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNArIONA. DICTIONARY 1507 (1981). The seeming redundancy of "natural" and "born" in the
phrase perhaps explains why Hamilton left "natural" out of his draft. See supra note 41.
The Oxford English Dictionary also indicates that "natural born" is not necessarily synonymous
with "native born": "Cf. native born." 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTrOINARY 38 (1961). The framers
used the term "native" citizen several times in speeches in the Convention; if the framers intended to
limit "natural born" to "native born" they would have done so explicitly. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra
note 19, at 236, 243; THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
78. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity
Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1358-59 (1983).
79. See, e.g., 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 235-38.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
81. U.S. CONsT-. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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pressed in their absolute prohibition of ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder.8 2 Similarly, the natural-born citizen clause, by requiring citi-
zenship from birth, prevents Congress from using its naturalization power
ad hoc to qualify candidates it favors or disqualify those it does not. Natu-
ralization statutes creating citizenship at birth logically can create natural-
born citizens only prospectively.
B. Structural Support
A structural argument may be drawn from these textual observations. A
bright-line test makes the most sense for eligibility requirements; there
should not be any significant doubt as to who is eligible. As Professor
Carter points out, "One can imagine a Constitution providing that elected
representatives be 'mature' or 'of good character,' but there is something
disturbing, almost counterintuitive, about such provisions .... ."" If the
natural born requirement seems unclear, perhaps we have been asking the
wrong questions.
Under the naturalized born approach, however, a "natural born citi-
zen" may be either of two things: a native-born citizen, or a naturalized-
born citizen designated under Congress' power to confer citizenship at
birth upon any category of persons. This system is singularly uncompli-
cated when compared to the traditional approach discussed in Section I.
The naturalized born approach enables courts to forgo a misdirected
search for specific intent regarding the facts of each case, for which there
are little or no primary source materials.84 Once the approach is estab-
lished, in order to determine whether or not a person is a natural-born
citizen, a court need only interpret the federal naturalization statutes in
effect at the time of his or her birth.85 Under current law it could easily
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (danger of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws).
83. Carter, supra note 78, at 1358-59. This point is related to the textual observation about
bright-line rules, supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text, but its emphasis is different. The textual
argument demonstrates that the other constitutional eligibility requirements surrounding the natural-
born citizen clause are bright-line rules. The argument here is that there are good reasons why all
eligibility rules should be bright-line. This does not mean that there could never be a case in which
the natural born requirement might have to be construed in its application to a particular circum-
stance, but it would never require looking beyond any individual's lifetime.
84. See Fallon, supra note 42, at 1215-17, 1242, 1255-58 (suggesting that proper level of gener-
ality of original intent should be determined by what creates most plausible and coherent interpreta-
tion in light of text, history, structure, and social policy).
85. This Section assumes that the natural-born citizen question would arise in federal court litiga-
tion. There are a number of ways in which litigation might arise: An opponent might try to keep the
candidate's name off the ballot at the nominating convention or keep the electors from voting for the
candidate in the electoral college. An opponent also might challenge the validity of bills signed by the
candidate once in office. Means, supra note 2, at 30; see also Gordon, supra note 2, at 28-31.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA'), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042
(1982), which place certain limits on campaign fundraising and spending and provide for the dis-
bursement of matching funds to qualified presidential candidates, could bring new actors into the
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be decided,88 for example, that a child born today would be a natural-
born citizen if born in the United States or if born abroad to at least one
resolution of any natural-born citizen clause dispute over a candidacy. Under the FECA and the
Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, the Federal Election Commission ("FEC")
must certify to the Treasury that a candidate meets the enumerated statutory eligibility requirements
to receive funds under the applicable act. See 11 C.F.R. § 9036 (1987). None of these acts refer to the
constitutional eligibility of candidates for federal office. Nevertheless, the issue of eligibility under the
natural-born citizen clause might be raised under the federal election laws, on a theory that constitu-
tional eligibility to hold office is an implicit condition to certification for receiving funds under the
Acts. A potential candidate could seek an advisory opinion regarding qualification as a natural-born
citizen through the formal process established by the FECA. 2 U.S.C. § 437f. An opposing candidate
might file a complaint with the FEC challenging the candidate's eligibility. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1). In
the alternative, the FEC could raise the issue sua sponte, or an individual voter could spur the FEC
into conducting an investigation. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d(a)(9), 438(b) (investigations). See generally 2
U.S.C. § 437d, g, h.
While the FEC might have a constitutional obligation to ensure that candidates to whom funds are
dispersed meet constitutional standards, it also has limited resources and limited expertise for making
constitutional interpretations. Thus, whatever the action taken by the FEC, the matter is likely to
reach its final resolution in the federal courts.
86. One final question that might complicate the determination is the status under this approach
of laws which make citizenship at birth subject to conditions and requirements after birth, such as a
loss of citizenship for the foreign-born child who does not reside in the U.S. for at least two years
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). These
conditional clauses pose serious constitutional problems under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Com-
ment, supra note 67. The courts and Congress have insisted that native-born and naturalized citizens
are equal in all rights under the Constitution except for eligibility for the presidency. See, e.g., Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 249 (1964) ("there is no second or third or fourth class of citizenship"); see
also cases cited supra note 4. The naturalized born approach would remove the exception for certain
classes of naturalized citizens.
Congress has begun to correct such inequities-for example, its repeal in 1978 of section 1401(b) of
title 8 (repealing requirement of two years residence between ages of 14 and 28 in U.S. for foreign-
born child claiming U.S. citizenship). 8 US.C. § 1401(b) (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-432, §§
1, 3, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978); see also Comment, supra note 67, at 331. Another example is the 1986
amendment of § 1401(g), which lessened the residency requirements for citizen parents to pass on
citizenship to their offspring from ten years to five. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1982) (amended 1986); see
also infra note 89.
Even if conditional clauses remain in force, however, their impact on the interpretation of the
natural-born citizen clause need not be significant. Professor Van Dyne rejects the idea of "qualified"
citizenship altogether by concluding that a child born abroad of an American father [parent] is a
natural-born citizen regardless of conditions subsequent to birth. F. VAN DYNE, supra note 65, at 32,
50. Professor Gordon points out that there is "no support whatever in the language or antecedents of
the Constitution" for the proposition that conditions subsequent negate natural-born status. Gordon,
supra note 2, at 23. In fact, conditional clauses have appeared in naturalization legislation since the
first Naturalization Act in 1790: natural-born status under that Act was subject to a requirement that
the person's father have resided in the United States. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103, 104; see also
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(g), 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952); Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952, § 301(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (repealed 1972).
Furthermore, it is not clear that native-born, as opposed to naturalized, citizens are immune from
losing their status subject to a condition subsequent. Foreign-born children acquirejful citizenship at
birth by parentage, even though that citizenship may be lost later under specified circumstances.
Thus, native-born citizens with a claim to dual citizenship by parentage must elect citizenship of one
country or the other; to that extent, even native citizenship may be considered qualified up until the
time of election. See Freedman, supra note 2, at 362-63.
Finally, citizenship acquired at birth but subject to a residency requirement should be held to
qualify as natural-born citizenship, since natural-born citizenship is relevant only to Presidential eligi-
bility-and the Presidential eligibility provisions of the Constitution themselves impose a residency
requirement. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. We can conclude, then, that a subsequent residency
requirement is at least not inconsistent with the other constitutional Presidential qualifications, and, at
least to the extent that the requirement does not exceed 14 years, it would not offend either their spirit
or letter.
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American parent, including American diplomatic and military personnel
stationed abroad.17 The child would be natural born if born on an Indian
reservation, or in Puerto Rico.88 A child born abroad with American
grandparents and alien parents or a person born in the Virgin Islands
before February 25, 1927 or a child born today in Guam would not be
natural born because he or she is not granted citizenship at birth under
current statutes.89
Looking to contemporary law rather than early American or British
law makes sense especially where, as in this case, the underlying assump-
tions about which groups are entitled to rights under the law have
changed significantly." Consistent with Fourteenth Amendment ideals
concerning due process and broadened political participation, this ap-
proach will most likely result in an expansive reading of who will be
eligible to run for office.9 Expanding the categories of natural-born citi-
zens makes the eligible candidates more representative of the voting popu-
lation, thereby increasing the rights of voters to select their representatives
as well as the rights of individuals to vie for the office of President. 2
The prospectivity of the naturalized born approach is also supported by
structural considerations. One might argue that Congress could exercise
its naturalization power by declaring that all heirs to the throne of Eng-
87. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a), (c)-(g), 1401a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
88. Id. §§ 1401(b), 1402.
89. Id. §§ 1406-1407. Under current immigration law, a person born after December 2, 1952 is a
U.S. citizen if at least one parent was a citizen of the U.S. and had a principal residence in the U.S.
before the child's birth. If both parents were citizens, there is no set term of residence. If one parent
was a U.S. citizen and the other an alien, the term of residence is five years, two before the birth of
the child. If one parent was a citizen and the other was born in an outlying possession of the United
States, the term of residence is one year. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1401a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
90. In areas where the law in effect at the time of the framers was discriminatory-and in the
area of naturalization it clearly was, see supra note 7-courts are especially likely to "modify" the
law on equal protection grounds in order to remove the discriminatory effects. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny for classification based on alienage); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (gender); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender).
91. Under the naturalized born approach, natural born status is not limited to native borns; also,
Congress may grant natural born status (citizenship at birth) to additional groups not included under
current naturalization laws. Congress and the courts have historically broadened citizenship rights
rather than narrowed them. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 826 (1971); see also supra note 7.
92. The significance of denying the right to hold office, even where the individual does "not covet
the public honors," 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 236, was recognized by the framers. See supra
notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has invalidated certain restrictions on candidacy on the grounds that they
impair voters' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974);
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968). Courts have occasionally suggested that there might be a fundamental right to
candidacy, independent of the right to vote. See Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973);
Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 94 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1971); Gordon, The Constitutional Right to
Candidacy, 25 U. KAN. L. REv. 545 (1977) (suggesting that right to candidacy be grounded in
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
Furthermore, the openness of the presidency is often held out as a symbol: "Part of the American
dream has long been the idea that any child, no matter how humble their origins, could grow up to be
President." Pre ,s release of Sen. Eagleton, supra note 8; see also Freedman, supra note 2, at 357.
Natural-Born Citizen
land will henceforth be citizens of the United States at birth and thus
eligible for the presidency. This would seem to contradict the framers'
desire to keep foreign royalty out of their nation's highest office-unless,
as this Note argues, the issue is not keeping royalty out per se, but rather
ensuring a minimum loyalty arising out of citizenship from birth. There is
some tension here, but prospectivity at least ensures that no particular
prince could be made a natural-born citizen and asked to run. It is rea-
sonable to posit that the framers agreed that Congress was a suitable body
to which to entrust such discretion, in spite of their occasional distrust of
popular legislatures.9" They were interested in creating a workable system
of government, and the naturalized born approach allocates power to a
body reasonably suited to the exercise of that power in a manageable
way.9'
IV. CONCLUSION
If the eligibility of a presidential candidate born outside the territorial
United States were challenged under the natural-born citizen clause to-
day, the outcome, based on traditional methods of approaching the clause,
would be unpredictable and unsatisfactory. This Note's approach removes
the confusion caused by Supreme Court dicta asserting that there are only
two classes of citizens, native-born and naturalized. As historical and tex-
tual analysis has shown, a citizen may be both "naturalized" and "natural
born." Under the naturalized born approach, any person with a right to
American citizenship under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States at the time of his or her birth is a natural-born citizen for
purposes of presidential eligibility.
93. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (dangers of popular "factions"); id. No. 48,
at 310-11 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (tendency of legislature to encroach on other depart-
ments of government); id. No. 49 (J. Madison) (same), No. 78, at 469-70 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961) (judiciary to guard against ill-considered acts of legislature). See generally Note, The Ori-
gins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
L.J. 694 (1985) (discussing Federalists' distrust of legislatures).
94. See J. ELY, supra note 73, at 92 (Constitution "overwhelmingly dedicated to concerns of
process and structure").
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